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INTRODUCTION
In April 1990, South Korea ratified the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),' the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),2 and the Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR (Protocol).3 The U.N. General Assembly had
adopted these Covenants in December 1966 and they entered into force
in 1976. These Covenants were drafted to embody the ideals enumerated
in the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.' As
core international norms and universal standards for the protection and
promotion of human rights,5 these Covenants have significantly influ-
enced the world community, along with other regional human rights
instruments such as the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
6
South Korea's ratification of the Covenants and the Optional Protocol
has profound implications. The Korean people may now be able to
invoke human rights norms which the State cannot modify or ignore.
Also, Korea has arrived at a turning point where it can reform its
disgraceful image as a violator of human rights, and it can take this
opportunity to enhance human rights protection according to the standards
recognized in the Covenants.
The government of South Korea did not establish a new Constitution
under the auspices of the United Nations until 1948. Although traditional
Confucianism still dominated Korean society, and vestiges of Japanese
colonial rule remained, the 1948 Constitution followed the basic concepts
1. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR].
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
3. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened
for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 302-46; G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter Protocol]. See UNITED
NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS
OF 31 DECEMBER 1992, at 114, 123, 154, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.Ell, U.N. Sales No.
E.93.V.11 (1993).
4. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
5. A. H. ROBERTSON & J. G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 286-87 (1989).
See also A. J. M. MILNE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN DIVERSITY 1-2 (1986); Burns H.
Weston, Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 14, 23-26 (Richard
P. Claude & Bums H. Weston eds., 2d ed. 1992).
6. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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of rights and political ideas enumerated in the constitutions of western
countries such as the United States, France, and Germany.7 It sought
democracy and equality of opportunity, resting "the sovereignty of the
Republic of Korea ... in the people" and "respecting and guaranteeing
the liberty, equality, and initiative of each individual."'  The new
Constitution embodied the ardent hope of the Korean people who had
suffered under Japanese imperialism from 1910 to 1945.
In 1952, however, an amendment was made to the Constitution under
declaration of martial law, involving a number of illegalities,9 designed
to extend the tenure of the incumbent president. This amendment set an
unfortunate precedent for future amendments which, up to the present
Constitution of 1987,' ° total nine. All of these constitutional amend-
ments, except for those of 1960 and those in the present Constitution of
1987,11 extended the term of office for the incumbent president or
provided ex post facto justifications for military coups d'etat. This
history of undemocratic amendments has transformed the Constitution of
South Korea into a mere instrument to be wielded by the president or
ruling party to maintain power.'
2
Furthermore, in the international community, South Korea is viewed
as a State which does not respect human rights. Prominent human rights
experts and international non-governmental organizations such as
Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and the
International League for Human Rights, have expressed concern about
human rights infringements in South Korea. They have reported that
Korean citizens have experienced illegal arrests and detentions, tortures,
imprisonments resulting from unfair trials, unexplained disappearances,
7. See JIN-O Yoo, HONPOP KICHO HOEGOROK [RETROSPECTIVE OF THE DRAFr OF THE
CONSTITUTION] (1980).
8. Gregory Henderson, Human Rights in South Korea: 1945-1953, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
KOREA 125, 148 (William Shaw ed., 1991).
9. DAE-KYu YOON, LAW AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN SOUTH KOREA 98 (1990).
10. See idt at 99-108.
11. The background of the 1987 Constitution is summarized in ASIA WATCH, RETREAT
FROM REFORM 1 (1990):
The tentative moves towards political openness came toward the end of the rule of
President Chun Doo-Hwan, whose administration had been marked by human rights
abuses, ranging from the Kwangju massacre in 1980 to imprisonment and torture of critics
and opponents and heavy-handed repression of the press.
Massive protests in the spring of 1987 attracted a wide cross-section of the South Korean
population and led to government acceptance of an eight-point reform proposal issued by
Rob Tae-Woo (then chairman of the ruling Democratic Justice Party) on June 29, 1987,
calling for direct presidential elections and other reform measures. In October, a newly
amended Constitution was approved in a national referendum.
12. LAWYERS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY & NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN
KOREA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH KOREA 5 (1992) [hereinafter COUNTER REPORT].
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and deaths from unknown causes. 13  These human rights violations
reinforce the deeply-rooted Korean notion that the law is "an instrument
at the State's disposal, not a device to regulate state power."' 14 In this
sense, the law has failed to pave the road towards democracy in South
Korea. 1"
The fact that South Korea has become a State Party to human rights
covenants, however, does not guarantee that the status of human rights in
South Korea will improve immediately. Numerous countries have signed
the Covenants, 6 yet it is unclear whether ratification in many of these
countries has resulted in greater respect for human rights. In fact,
signatories may not be making the continual and adequate effort to extend
fundamental freedoms and basic rights as required by their domestic laws
and the Covenants. For some countries, ratification may simply be a
pretense of performing the responsibilities required in the international
community, while in reality their citizens may still be suffering from
severe infringements of the human rights guaranteed by the Covenants. '7
Therefore, a country's ratification of the Covenants does not guarantee
human rights protection.
13. See ARTICLE 19 WORLD REPORT 1988, at 149-53 (Kevin Boyle ed., 1988); ASIA
WATCH ET AL., FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (1988); Jerome A.
Cohen, Arms Sales and Human Rights: The Case of South Korea, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 255 (Peter G. Brown & Douglas MacLean eds., 1979); FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
NATIONAL DEFENSE DIVISION ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
AND THE U.S. RESPONSE 219-37 (1978); HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA, supra note 8;
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, TO THE PRECIPICE AND BEYOND: A REVIEW
OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, JANUARY 1986-JULY 1987 (1987);
INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP,
DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH KOREA: A PROMISE UNFULFILLED (1985); INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA (1983); GILBURT D. LOESCHER & ANN D. LOESCHER, HUMAN RIGHTS:
A GLOBAL CRISIS (1978); A. GLENN MOWER, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY 137-49 (1987); STEPHEN A. OXMAN ET AL., SOUTH KOREA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
EMERGING POLITICS (1987); James M. West & Edward J. Baker, The 1987 Constitutional
Reforms in South Korea: Electoral Processes and Judicial Independence, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS.
Y.B. 135 (1988); WORLD HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDE 185-88 (Charles Humana comp., 3d ed.
1992).
14. YOON, supra note 9, at 200.
15. Id. at 201.
16. As of December 1991, there were 100 State Parties to the ICESCR and, as of July
1992, 111 State Parties to the ICCPR.
17. Many countries ratified the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but have failed to
live up to its provisions. Ratification was a propaganda ploy which, to some extent, masked
the large-scale fraud which the governments perpetrated among their peoples in giving lip
service to human rights. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 19
(1991) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs).
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In the case of South Korea, in July 1991 the government submitted
its initial report8 to the Human Rights Committee (HRC)' 9 in accordance
with article 40 of the ICCPR. The report was examined by the HRC in
July 1992 and will be discussed in Part I of this article. While reviewing
the issues discussed in the report, bear in mind that the initial report will
become a model for all future reports submitted to international human
rights bodies.
The ICESCR also requires State Parties to submit reports,20 but the
initial report of the South Korean government has not yet been considered
by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 2' Because
the relevant government reports have not been reviewed, this paper will
only discuss briefly, in Part II, the infringements of various economic,
social, and cultural rights caused by the unbalanced growth-oriented
economic policy of the past.
Meanwhile, questions remain as to whether, under Korean law, the
Covenants are applicable to domestic human rights matters. These
questions include: (1) Are individuals, whose human rights have been
infringed by the State or other agency, able to claim protection for their
rights and to claim relevant remedies before domestic courts simply on
the basis of Covenant violations (i.e., direct application of the Cove-
nants)? 22 (2) If provisions of the Covenants conflict with those of
domestic law, which law is controlling (i.e., hierarchy of the domestic
laws and Covenants)? These questions will be addressed in Part III.
Because the effectiveness of the supervisory procedure under the
Covenants is influenced by the degree of good faith cooperation of the
signatory States, and despite the fact that the discussions in such
supervisory procedures are in the nature of "constructive dialogues
23
18. Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Initial Reports of State Parties Due in 1991; Addendum, Republic of Korea, U.N. GAOR, Hum.
Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/68/Add.1 (1991) [hereinafter Initial Report].
19. Established under the ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 28.
20. "The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit in conformity with this
part of the Covenant reports on the measures which they have adopted and the progress made
in achieving the observance of the rights recognized herein." ICESCR, supra note 1, art. 16(1).
21. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights began its work in 1987. It
works under the aegis of the United Nations Economic and Social Council which is formally
entrusted with evaluating reports submitted under the ICESCR.
22. The term "direct application" is very similar to the term "self-executing," but "direct
application" will be used throughout this article, because it seems to express more effectively
the notion that the Covenants will be a part of the domestic legal system. See John H. Jackson,
Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310 n.1
(1992).
23. Theo Van Boven, The International Systems of Human Rights: An Overview, in
MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING 8, 73, 121, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/91/1 (1991)
[hereinafter MANUAL ON REPORTING].
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which have no binding effect on State Parties, direct application of the
Covenants may provide prompt and effective relief measures to victims
of human rights violations. After discussing the validity of several
domestic laws which appear to violate the Covenants, Part IV will review
a recent Constitutional Court decision which referred to the ICCPR.
I. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE INITIAL REPORT
SUBMITTED TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
A. Consideration of the Initial Report
Under article 40 of the ICCPR, the State Party undertakes to submit
reports on the measures it has adopted which give effect to the rights
recognized in the ICCPR and demonstrate the progress it has made in
granting its citizens the enjoyment of those rights. The reports should
indicate the factors and difficulties affecting the implementation of the
ICCPR. 24 The State Party is required to submit an initial report within
one year of ratifying the ICCPR and subsequent reports every five years
thereafter. 25 The HRC reviews the reports and transmits appropriate
comments to the State Party.
The rules of procedure and practice of the HRC provide that the
Committee review takes place in a public meeting with the representatives
of the State Party. 6 The following is a summary of statements provided
by the South Korean government in response to questions posed by
members of the HRC during the Committee review, followed by
comments on the government's position.
1. General Status of Human Rights Protection
In response to questions regarding the general status of human rights,
the South Korean representative replied: "The people of the Republic
were now living under the rule of law in a democracy, completely free
from the authoritarian tinges of the past. Human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including freedom of the press, were guaranteed and
24. Id at 80-81.
25. Id at 80.
26. Id at 121-22. In its review of State reports, the Human Rights Committee is neither
a judicial nor a quasi-judicial body. Its role is not to pass judgment on the implementation of
the provisions of the ICCPR in any given State. The main function of the HRC is to assist
State Parties in fulfilling their obligations under the ICCPR, to make available to them the
experience the HRC has acquired in its examination of other reports, and to discuss with them
any issue related to the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the ICCPR in a particular country.
[V/ol. 14:705
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safeguarded." 27
. Discrepancies, however, exist between the claims of the South Korean
government and observations made by those outside the country. The
South Korean government stressed that "[u]nder the Constitution, as
revised on 29 October 1987, institutional measures had been strengthened
to embody genuinely democratic principles, and to enhance the protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms." 28 Amnesty International,
however, issued a document in June 1992 which states:
The strengthening of human rights guarantees in the Constitution of the
Republic of Korea (South Korea) which came into force in February
1988 and the subsequent legislative changes were welcomed by Amnesty
International. There is still concern, however, that some political
prisoners have been denied the right to a fair trial, that the government
has failed to take effective steps to end torture and ill-treatment, that
current legislation restricts some essential aspects of the rights of
freedom of expression and association, and that the death penalty has not
yet been abolished.29
In addition, the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
published by the U.S. Department of State in February 1991, gives a
negative impression of the status of human rights in South Korea in 1990:
The Republic of Korea continued a transition from authoritarianism
towards democracy and openness begun in 1987; however, elements of
its authoritarian past remained. Power remained highly centralized,
though less so than in previous years. Surveillance of political oppo-
nents by security forces continued, as well as detentions under sweeping
national security laws .... The authorities also detained a large number
of such people who held views the Government considered dangerous,
often failing to present warrants as required by law.30
These two statements exemplify the common view that a number of
undemocratic and authoritarian elements remain in Korean society which
hinder the Korean people's full enjoyment of fundamental freedoms.
Thus, the Amnesty International and U.S. State Department reports
substantiate the charge that the Korean government must make greater
efforts to abolish obstacles to human rights reform.
27. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 45th Sess., 1150th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR. 1150 (1992) [hereinafter CCPR/C/SR. 1150] (statement of Mr. Soo Gil Park).
28. Id. at 2.
29. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Al INDEX: ASA 25/14/92, SOUTH KOREA: AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS 1 (1992) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS].
30. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS & HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 102D
CONG., IST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990, at 929 (Jt.
Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS] (submitted by the U.S. Dept. of State).
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2. Relationship Between Domestic Law and the ICCPR
With respect to inquiries made by the HRC aimed at delimiting the
relationship between domestic law and the ICCPR, the Korean govern-
ment stated:
Since Article 6(1) of the Constitution of South Korea provides that
'[t]reaties duly concluded and promulgated under the Constitution and
the generally recognized rules of international law shall have the same
effect as the domestic laws of the Republic of Korea,' the Covenant,
which was ratified and promulgated by the Government with the consent
of the National Assembly, has the same effect as domestic laws without
the enactment of separate domestic regulation. The Korean government
has concluded that the Constitution does not conflict with the Cove-
nant.
31
The South Korean government's confirmation that, under the
Constitution the ICCPR has the same effect as domestic laws and does
not require enabling legislation, implies that the ICCPR applies directly
to domestic cases. 32 The South Korean government's apparent acceptance
of the ICCPR's direct applicability contrasts with the U.S. position that
the provisions of articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-
executing.33
31. Initial Report, supra note 18, at 2. By the same token, the government delegate stated
that Korea had acceded to the ICESCR and ICCPR in order to solidify the protection of human
rights in Korea and to join the international effort to promote human rights. "All the rights
provided for in the Covenant were guaranteed by the Constitution, which stipulated that all trea-
ties duly concluded and promulgated should have the same effect as domestic laws. Together,
the two instruments formed the cent[er]piece of human rights law of the Republic."
CCPR/CISR. 1150, supra note 27, at 2-4.
32. COUNTER REPORT, supra note 12, at 7.
33. A U.S. representative has stated:
At this time, I would like to stress [that] the substantive provisions of the Covenant should
be declared to be nonself-executing-this would mean that the Covenant provisions, when
ratified, will not, by themselves, create private rights enforceable in U.S. courts, it could
only be done by legislation adopted by the Congress. Since existing U.S. law generally
complies with the Covenant, we do not contemplate proposing implementing legislation.
Hearing, supra note 17, at 9, 15 (statement of Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs).
In opposition to this view, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York argues:
A declaration that the covenant is not self-executing, and would require separate
legislation specifically implementing its provisions, would severely undermine the
significance of ratification by further postponing the practical effectiveness of the
Covenant until after another series of legislative actions. The Covenant does not require
that treaties be implemented by legislation before they become U.S. law. The question
of whether the parties to a treaty intended specific provisions to be self-executing has long
been treated as a question for judicial interpretation and has turned largely on the
specificity of the treaty language and its amenability to self-execution. The interpretive
question of which provisions of the covenant are intended to be self-executing should be
left to the courts, as in the case of other treaties, and should not be the occasion for yet
[Vol. 14:705
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Looking only at the application of the ICCPR, the South Korean
government's interpretation seems more positive than that of the United
States, given that there is little difference between the contents of the
relevant articles in the two countries' Constitutions.3 When asked as part
of the HRC review whether the ICCPR could be nullified by subsequent
domestic legislation, the South Korean government delegate answered
that:
[M]any members had asked about the relationship between the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Korea and the Covenant. Under [Alrticle 6(1)
of the Constitution, the Covenant had the same effect as domestic law.
He [the delegate] could not accept the claim that the guarantees
contained in the Covenant might be overturned by subsequent domestic
legislation, since such a suspicion underestimated the Republic of
Korea's commitment to human rights and the increasing public aware-
ness of the rights enshrined in the Covenant, thanks to the Government's
public awareness campaign.35
It is unlikely, however, that a government delegate's commitment to
uphold the ICCPR has any legal meaning or binding effect on govern-
ment authorities or the courts. Rather, this statement suggests that the
ICCPR is not superior to domestic legislation (laws enacted by the
National Assembly or administrative agencies). In principle, subsequent
domestic legislation may supersede the ICCPR where there is a conflict.
36
If such is the case, the significance of South Korea's ratification of the
ICCPR will diminish markedly.
With respect to an individual's access to domestic courts on the basis
of the ICCPR, the South Korean government delegate commented: "[I]f
an individual claimed that his rights under the Covenant had been
another delay in making those parts of the Covenant which are obviously intended to be
self-executing immediately binding on courts and government officials.
Id. at 76.
The government of South Korea made reservations regarding self-execution of the ICCPR
under articles 14(5), 14(7), and 22. See ICCPR, supra note 2. In opposition to this, the
Korean Bar Association submitted an opinion calling for the withdrawal of those reservations.
See Hyun-Suk Yoo, Kukje Inkwon Kyuyak-kwa Popyool Samu [International Human Rights
Covenants and Legal Affairs], 169 INKWON-KWA JUNGUI [HUM. RTS. & JUST.] 98 (1990).
34. "Treaties duly concluded and promulgated under the Constitution and the generally
recognized rules of international law shall have the same effect as the domestic laws of the
Republic of Korea." KOREA CONST. ch. I, art. 6(1). Cf. U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2: "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
35. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 45th Sess., 1154th mtg. at 3, U.N. DoC.
CCPR/C/SR. 1154 (1992) [hereinafter CCPR/C/SR. 1154] (statement of Mr. Kook Hyun Yoo).
36. This is similar to the view that the domestic effect of the ICCPR is the same as laws
enacted by the National Assembly. See infra part III.B.
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infringed, the court would normally rule on the basis of domestic
legislation; in the rare cases where that was not possible, the Covenant
could be invoked directly by the courts."37 There are, however, some
questions left unanswered by this statement: (1) If the Covenant has been
duly incorporated into the domestic legal system without the enactment
of separate domestic regulation, and it has the same effect as domestic
law, why are courts generally unable to invoke the ICCPR directly,
especially given that its language is not always identical to that of
domestic legislation? (2) Who determines whether or not the case in
question is the "rare case" where, on the basis of domestic legislation
only, a court ruling is impossible? (3) In a "rare case," must the
individual, who claims that his rights under the ICCPR have been
violated, invoke both the Covenant and other relevant domestic legislation
so that the court can choose between the two at its discretion? Parts III
and IV of this article will address these questions.
3. Factors Affecting the Implementation of the ICCPR
In explaining difficulties affecting the implementation of the ICCPR,
the government delegate stated:
One of the most important factors affecting the implementation of the
Covenant was the tense situation resulting from the division of the
Korean peninsula. . . . Armed forces totalling 1.5 million were in a
military stand-off along the 38th parallel, and, despite the end of the
cold war, the Armistice Agreement had still not been replaced by a
peace settlement .... Accordingly, the National Security Law adopted
by the Republic to protect its security and the integrity of the system
still had its raison d'etre.
38
It is unclear, however, what concrete effects the relationship between
North and South Korea has had on the daily lives of Korean people. The
term "affect" does not permit the objective evaluation of the history of
human rights abuses in modem Korean society. For example, the
following is a description of the 1974 trial of the "People's Revolutionary
Party":
The trial was held not before a regular court but before a military
tribunal established by the 1974 emergency decrees. Hearings were
closed, with only one member of each defendant's family allowed to
attend. The "confessions" were admitted into evidence, even though
they were extracted under hideous forms of torture. Moreover, forty-two
prosecution witnesses testified in the absence of defense lawyers, who
37. CCPR/C/SR.1154, supra note 35, at 3.
38. CCPR/C/SR.1 150, supra note 27, at 4 (emphasis added).
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were apparently under house arrest at the time. In any event the defense
was not permitted to question prosecution witnesses and statements. No
defense witnesses were allowed. Government-controlled media
proclaimed the guilt of the accused before judgment was rendered. No
foreign journalists were permitted at the trial because, according to the
prime minister, '[t]here was too great a risk they misunderstand and
misrepresent what happened in court.' In April 1975, after the Supreme
Court upheld the eight death sentences and all but two of the prison
sentences meted out - but before the accused could exercise their rights
to petition the Supreme Court for retrial and petition the president for
mercy - the eight condemned to death were unlawfully hanged, despite
assurances from the Public Prosecutor's Department that no executions
would take place until the accused had an opportunity to exhaust their
rights. The government cremated the bodies of a number of those
executed, thereby preventing any examination for signs of physical
torture.39
It is unclear how this trial could be blamed on the "relations between
the two Koreas." Even if a country is divided in two, human rights
abuses should not be expected. Neither should trials involving political
dissidents be unfair. This abuse occurred because South Korea has not
practiced democracy, not simply because the Korean peninsula was
divided. In sum, the relationship between the two Koreas has not
"affected" the human rights situation; instead it has been an ideological
pretext used to oppress individuals and to maintain the masked legitimacy
of dictatorship.
Improved relations between North and South Korea may ease
implementation of the ICCPR. The government of South Korea has
declared on several occasions that it would cease hostilities toward North
Korea.4 In September 1991, South Korea and North Korea were
admitted to the membership of the United Nations. On February 19,
1992, the two Korean governments achieved their first official agreement.
The Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and
Cooperation between the South and the North (South-North Agreement)
41
was signed by the prime ministers of each country and became effective
after ratification by the presidents of the South and North Korean
governments. 42 On March 20, 1992, both governments jointly registered
39. Cohen, supra note 13, at 264.
40. COUNTER REPORT, supra note 12, at 3.
41. Dec. 13, 1991, South Korea-North Korea.
42. According to the South-North Agreement, South Korea and North Korea pledge to
exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification, to respect each other's political and social
system (art. 1), to refrain from slander and vilification of each other (art. 3), and to abstain
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the South-North Agreement with the Secretariat of the United Nations.
These changes between the two Koreas should remove any military
obstacles in the way of ICCPR implementation.
4. Future Program to Promote Human Rights
In response to questions regarding the future of human rights in South
Korea, the representative stated:
As part of its future progra[m] to promote universal human rights, [the
g]overnment planned to accede to the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It was
also finalizing amendments to the Penal Code and the Code of Penal
Procedure to reinforce the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, and to
introduce measures for more effective review of warrants .... [I]t had
set up a working group ... to streamline labor-related domestic law.
The group was also considering an amendment to the Labour Union Act
to allow multiple unions in a single workplace, which was at present
prohibited. The Republic would thus continue its endeavors to improve
its institutions and practices relevant to human rights and to incorporate
the spirit and principles of the Constitution and the Covenant into the
daily life of the people.43
The South Korean government should immediately follow through
with its plans and sign the Torture Convention. For much of human
history, torture has been a symbol of evil, devastating the integrity and
dignity of a human being. Torture cannot be justified for any reason or
under any circumstance. Nevertheless, torture has been used frequently
in South Korea not only to force accused persons to confess, but also to
repress political opponents and dissidents. No evidence indicates that the
practice of torture has disappeared from the interrogation process,
although no recent reports testify of brutal battery, water, or electric
torture.
Furthermore, a number of laws should be amended or repealed in the
context of implementing the ICCPR." The present package of govern-
from armed aggression along the Military Demarcation Line specified in the Military Armistice
Agreement of July 27, 1953, an agreement that was signed after the Korean War (arts. 9, 11).
Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the
South and the North, Dec. 13, 1991, South Korea-North Korea.
43. Initial Report, supra note 18, at 5.
44. See infra part III.C. Strengthening the functions of the two Committees under the
Covenants may induce the government to be more active in implementing the provisions of the
Covenants. For an analysis of the efficiency of the supervisory function of the Human Rights
Committee, see Dana D. Fischer, Reporting under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
The First Five Years of the Human Rights Committee, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 142 (1982). He
concludes:
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ment reform programs, however, includes no such plans. According to
the HRC, the South Korean government should intensify its efforts to
bring its law more into line with the provisions of the ICCPR. The HRC
recommended that the government make a serious attempt to phase out
the National Security Law which it characterized as a major obstacle to
the full realization of the rights enshrined in the ICCPR. In the mean-
time, the HRC cautioned the South Korean government not to derogate
from certain basic rights.4
While the initial report indicates improvement in the protection of
human rights in South Korea, more improvement is needed before the
experience of Korean citizens mirrors that of the report.
B. Consideration of Communications Under the Optional Protocol
Under the Protocol, individuals who claim that their rights under the
ICCPR have been violated, and who have exhausted all available
domestic remedies, may submit written communications of their cases to
the HRC for consideration. The HRC examines a communication only
if certain prerequisites are satisfied. For example, the HRC must
ascertain: (1) that the communication is not anonymous and that it
emanates from an individual, or individuals, subject to the jurisdiction of
a State Party to the Protocol; (2) that the communication is submitted by
the individual himself or by his representative; and (3) that the same
matters are not being examined under another procedure of international
investigation or settlement.4 6
If a case meets the HRC prerequisites, both the individual and the
In its first 5 years of practice, the Committee has achieved an impressive momentum, but
it can be derailed in the future at any one of several points: the state parties could cease
cooperating; tighter structures could be placed on the use of sources of information other
than the reports; the state parties could ensure an ineffective Committee through the
electoral process; and finally, the willingness to seek a middle ground between opposing
positions might stop short of finding a way to move from "general" comments to specific
recommendations on the law and practice of individual state parties.
Id. at 153.
The initial report of the South Korean government states that numerous private
organizations exist in the Republic of Korea to ensure the protection of human rights, the
Korean Federal Bar Association being the most prominent. Initial Report, supra note 18, at
3. If the chance to serve as a member of the Human Rights Committee is offered to South
Korea, it will be desirable to nominate a representative from one of these organizations.
45. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., at 1-3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.6 (1992).
Rosalyn Higgins, a member of the Human Rights Committee, pointed out that the next task of
the South Korean government should be to check systematically existing and pending laws not
only for constitutionality but for compliance with the ICCPR. She added that the Constitution
of South Korea alone does not cover all the rights enshrined in the ICCPR. CCPR/C/SR. 1154,
supra note 35, at 11-12.
46. Protocol, supra note 3, arts. 1-3.
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State Party are asked to make further presentations on the merits. When
these submissions are received, the HRC is in a position to make a
substantive decision. This determination is called the HRC's "views".'
Since the HRC started working during its second session in 1977 up to
the thirty-second session in 1988, 288 communications relating to alleged
violations by twenty-six State Parties were placed before it for consider-
ation. During that period, 146 formal decisions were adopted. Among
those, eighty-three communications were concluded by adoption of views,
and twenty communications were declared admissible.4
The following are two communications which, had the Korean people
been aware of an opportunity, could have been submitted to the HRC
under the Protocol. In February 1990, Ms. Lim Soo-Kyung and Father
Moon Kyu-Hyun, who had been imprisoned for visiting North Korea
without authorization from the South Korean government, submitted a
communication to UNESCO. 49 On June 30, 1989, Ms. Lim had traveled
to Pyongyang, North Korea via Japan and the former West Germany to
participate in the thirteenth World Festival for Youth and Students as a
representative of the National Council of Student Representatives of
South Korea. While in North Korea, she advocated the peaceful
reunification of Korea and participated in the International March for
Peace and Korean Reunification. On July 11 and 27, she requested
permission from the United Nations Command to cross the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ) that divides Korea in two in order to return to South Korea,
but her request was denied. On July 26, 1989, Father Moon Kyu-Hyun,
a representative of the Catholic Priests Association for Justice in South
47. Rosalyn Higgins, The United Nations Human Rights Committee, in HUMAN RIGHTS
FOR THE 1990s: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 67, 73 (Robert Blackburn & John
Taylor eds., 1991). In addition, it has been noted that:
[T]he Committee applies the provisions of the Covenant and of the Optional Protocol in
a judicial spirit and, performs functions similar to those of the European Commission of
Human Rights, in as much as the consideration of applications from individuals is
concerned. Its decisions on the merits (of a communication) are, in principle, comparable
to the reports of the European Commission, non-binding recommendations. The two
systems differ, however, in that the Optional Protocol does not provide explicitly for
friendly settlement between the parties, and, more importantly, in that the Committee has
no power to hand down binding decisions as does the European Court of Human Rights.
State parties to the Optional Protocol endeavor to observe the Committee's views, but in
case of non-compliance the Optional Protocol does not provide for an enforcement
mechanism or for sanctions.
UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, 2 SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990)
[hereinafter SELECTED DECISIONS].
48. SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 47, at 1.
49. Communication No. 826/89. See Cho Yong-Whan, Kukjejuk Inkwon Boho Jedo-wa
Jyong Kanungsung [Use of International Human Rights Instruments], in 5 POP-KWA SAHOE
[LAW & SOCIETY] 88, 113 (1990).
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Korea, arrived in Pyongyang to accompany Ms. Lim in returning to South
Korea. On August 15, 1989, they crossed the DMZ.
After crossing the DMZ, they were immediately arrested by the
United Nations Command and turned over to the secret police of South
Korea. They were each sentenced to five years of imprisonment. A
South Korean court held that they were guilty not only for visiting North
Korea, but also for their speeches and discussions which the court
characterized as praise, encouragement, or siding with North Korea in
violation of the National Security Law. Ms. Lim and Father Moon
argued that the South Korean government violated the freedoms of
thought, conscience, expression, and assembly as protected under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR.5
The second communication was submitted directly to the HRC by
Mr. Sohn Jong-Kyu in July 1992, after being imprisoned for violating the
Labor Dispute Adjustment Law5' by engaging in a third party's labor
dispute. Mr. Sohn has been the president of the Kumho Company Trade
Union since September 1990. In the Autumn of 1990, the leaders of a
number of trade unions of large companies, including Mr. Sohn, formed
the Solidarity Forum of Large Company Trade Unions. In February
1991, they held a meeting to promote the solidarity of the organization
in the northern district of Seoul. At this meeting, they adopted a
statement of the Solidarity Forum and a joint statement with other labor
organizations, proclaiming that they would support the strike of the
Daewoo Shipyard Trade Union previously started on Guhjae Island.
Consequently, over 60 officers of the Solidarity Forum, including Mr.
Sohn, were apprehended by the police as they left the meeting.
Mr. Sohn was indicted and sentenced to one and a half years of
imprisonment for violation of article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjust-
ment Law, which prohibits a third party from participating in a labor
dispute.52 Mr. Sohn argued that punishment under article 13-2 of the
Labor Dispute Adjustment Law violated freedom of expression under the
ICCPR.
Few Koreans submit communications to the HRC under the Protocol.
Currently, the communication procedure under the Protocol is unfamiliar
to the Korean people, but it is expected that eventually they will learn to
use it when the occasion demands.53
50. Ms. Lim Soo-Kyung and Father Moon Kyu-Hyun were released on December 24,
1992, shortly after Kim Young-Sam, the ruling party's candidate, won the presidential election.
51. Law No. 1327 of Apr. 13, 1963, amended by Law No. 3351 of Dec. 31, 1980 (Korea).
52. Id art. 13-2. See infra part III.C.4.
53. While consideration of reports submitted by State Parties under the ICCPR is open to
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II. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: INEQUALITY
AND OTHER DRAWBACKS TO SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMIC GROWTH
Since the 1960s, South Korea has experienced rapid economic growth
and industrialization. While economic growth increased the gross income
of the country, the process of transforming an agrarian society into an
industrialized one created numerous problems. Due to the primary
emphasis on growth and export, complaints about human rights infringe-
ments could not surface until recently. 4 Previously, those with grievanc-
es were silenced or punished in the name of law and order. The
following are some brief illustrations of the most compelling problems
whose solutions will be sought in the context of the ICESCR.
The first problem is that rural communities have been impoverished.
As rural communities became main sources of labor for industry, their
population and income decreased markedly. Since the latter half of the
1960s, about 500,000-600,000 rural people have migrated to the cities
each year. According to government records, in 1988 the gross income
per household in rural communities increased approximately 24.4 percent
from the previous year, but debt also increased by over 31 percent during
that same period." As a result, the rural communities of South Korea
have been alienated from economic development, social welfare, and
cultural benefits. 6
the public, the examination of communications under the Protocol is closed. All considerations
of communications under the Protocol are through written documents, not oral presentations.
The communications are not available to outside organizations, such as human rights lawyers
or activists. Moreover, since the Protocol does not provide for enforcement mechanisms or for
sanctions, the HRC often has to prescribe its own sanctions in cases where a State Party fails
to provide adequate remedies despite the HRC views. These two issues of accountability
should be reviewed carefully in order to ensure human rights protection. For more details, see
Higgins, supra note 47, at 73-74; SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 47, at 2.
54. The Asian Coalition for Housing Rights chronicles recent economic history as follows:
National wealth increased twelve times over since 1955. Seoul was physically rebuilt
from the ruins of the 1950-1953 war and now rivals Tokyo in size and sophistication.
In 1960 there was one bridge over the Han River linking the two halves of Seoul; now
there are eighteen.... There is a dark side to this development. Workers, farmers and
urban poor have not shared to any great degree in the benefits. Past authoritarian regimes
have made it extremely difficult to protest against this exclusion, and so it continued.
ASIAN COALITION FOR HOUSING RIGHTS, BATTLE FOR HOUSING RIGHTS IN KOREA 24 (1989).
55. CHOSON ILBO [THE KOREA DAILY NEws], Apr. 22, 1989. In proportion to the
country's economic growth, the government has opened up its market to foreign goods as part
of an important liberalization scheme. The massive importation of farm and livestock products
has depressed prices, especially of grains and livestock, which led, in turn, to the inability of
farmers to pay their loans. See OXMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 84.
56. See Mi-Hwa Chung, Nongmin, Yosung, Dosi Binmin Moonje [Farmers, Women and
Urban Poor Problems], 4 INKWON BoGosU [HUM. RTS. REP.] 207 (1990); Kyung-Woo Lee,
Kita Sahoe Kyungjejuk Kwonri [Social and Economic Rights], 3 INKWON BOGosU [HUM. RTS.
REP.] 221 (1989).
[Vol. 14:705
South Korea: Human Rights Covenants
Second, in the process of industrialization, people who migrated from
rural areas became the urban poor. Because most of them were
uneducated and had no special skills, they held low income jobs and
accumulated no savings. Their housing situation remains very unstable
and unsafe; while parents are out working, young children are often
alone.
From the early 1980s until recently, the principal government housing
program has been the city redevelopment program. The government has
designated about 200 areas in Seoul, housing two to three million people,
for this program. The areas are generally inhabited by lower income
people, with three families to a house. The program has been described
as joint redevelopment, because responsibility is shared by the coopera-
tive of home owners and the construction company.
57
Renters, however, are not eligible to join the cooperative or to rent
apartments in new buildings erected under the redevelopment programs.
Furthermore, they can no longer own homes or rent rooms in the
redeveloped areas where their workshops are often located because of the
dramatic increase in rents since the completion of the redevelopment plan.
As a result, the urban poor are forced to the outskirts of the city, making
it more difficult for them to find jobs and nearly impossible for them to
escape from absolute poverty. Yet the government has no effective plans
to supply them with adequate housing, better job opportunities, or health
care facilities.
The third problem is caused by industry's ready access to cheap
labor, which was one of the most important elements in enabling the
rapid growth of the South Korean economy. 58 Because the government's
priority has been to maximize factory output, labor conditions in the
factory has been long neglected. The establishment and activity of labor
unions have been seriously restricted. Thus, while South Korea's labor
productivity has increased, laborers have been suffering under excessive
overtime demands and very poor working conditions, 59 resulting in one
57. ASIAN COALITION FOR HOUSING RIGHTS, supra note 54, at 27.
58. See Kap-Bae Kim, Nodongja-ui Kwolli [Rights of Laborers], 3 INKWON BOGosU
[HUM. RTS. REP.] 161 (1989); Sun-Soo Kim, Nodongja-ui Kwolli [Rights of Laborers], 4
INKVON BoGosu [HUM. RTS. REP.] 112 (1990).
59. See the following table:
Hours of Work in Manufacturing, 1976-1985
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of the highest industrial accident rates in the world.'
Fourth, as in the Confucian tradition, Korean women have a different
social position than men. Confucian philosophy granted men all of
society's privileges. The role of women was confined to household
affairs and social activities, and the participation of women in other
activities was virtually disregarded. As Korean society became industrial-
ized, however, the demand for women in the labor force increased. In an
earlier stage of industrialization, women were engaged mainly in jobs
men avoided because of low pay or the nature of the work, but due to
industrial expansion, the job market for women diversified. However,
discrimination in such areas as wages, working conditions, and the
retirement age has not improved. The demand for equal treatment of
women increased in various sectors, 6' and, as a result, in 1987 the
Gender-Equal Opportunity Employment Act was enacted. 62 Additionally,
the Constitution was revised in 1987 to provide specifically for the















International Labor Office Report (1986), reprinted in ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT:
SOUTH KOREA AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION 205 (1989).
60. See the following table:
Rate of Industrial Accidents





South Korea, Ministry of Labor Report, reprinted in Kap-Bae Kim, supra note 58, at 194.
61. See Chung, supra note 56, at 229-38; Lee, supra note 56, at 258-62.
62. Law No. 3989 of Dec. 4, 1987, amended by Law No. 4126 of Apr. 1, 1989 (Korea).
63. "Special protection shall be given to labor of women, and women shall not be
discriminated [against] in employment, wage [or] labor conditions." KOREA CONST. ch. H, art.
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of discrimination against women in hiring, wage levels, and working
conditions is strictly prohibited. Furthermore, by virtue of the efforts of
prominent feminist groups, the Family Law was amended in 1990 to
guarantee equality in marriage" and inheritance. 65  Despite these
developments, certain laws, regulations, customs, and practices still
prevent women from fully enjoying their economic and social rights.
As shown above, Korean society suffers from numerous problems
directly or indirectly caused by rapid industrialization. Accession to the
ICESCR is expected to contribute greatly to redressing this distorted
social structure.
III. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DOMESTIC LAWS AND THE
COVENANTS: THEORIES AND APPLICATION
A. Direct Applicability
Because the two Covenants have been duly concluded and promulgat-
ed with the consent of the National Assembly as required by the
Constitution,6 under Article 6(1) they "have the same effect as the
domestic laws of the Republic of Korea." There is no dispute that the
ICCPR directly applies to domestic cases involving human rights
violations. 67 Thus, as mentioned in the government's initial report, the
ICCPR has been effectively incorporated into the domestic legal arena
without the enactment of separate domestic legislation. Anyone whose
rights under the ICCPR have been violated may directly invoke the
ICCPR before a domestic court for damages or for cancellation or
nullification of the State organ's acts.68
32(4). "The State shall endeavor to promote the welfare and rights of women." KOREA CONST.
ch. 11, art. 34(3).
64. KOREA CIVIL CODE pt. IV, ch. III.
65. KOREA CIVIL CODE pt. V.
66. Article 60 provides:
The National Assembly shall have power to consent to the conclusion and ratification of
treaties pertaining to mutual assistance or mutual security; treaties concerning important
international organizations; treaties of friendship, trade and navigation; treaties pertaining
to any restriction in sovereignty; peace [treaties]; [treaties] which will burden the State or
people with an important financial obligation; or treaties related to legislative affairs.
KOREA CONST. ch. Il1, art. 60(1).
67. See Choong-Hyun Baek, Kookje Inkwon Kyuyak-ui Pop-juk Uiui [The Legal
Significance of the Ratification of International Human Rights Covenants], 21 JusnCE 7 (1988);
Jung-Bae Chun, Kukje lnkwon Kyuyak-kwa Hankook-ui Hyunsil [International Human Rights
Covenants and the Reality of Korea], 140 PoPJo CHUNCHU 75 (1992); Yoo, supra note 33, at
98-104.
68. Cf. supra note 38 and accompanying text. Using this reasoning, the government
delegate's statement has no legal support.
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On the other hand, Korean scholars generally believe that the
ICESCR is not directly applicable to domestic cases. 69 They distinguish
between the obligations of the government under the two Covenants:
while the obligations of the government under the ICCPR must be carried
out immediately after accession, those under the ICESCR are to be
progressively realized within the limitations of State Parties' situations
and circumstances.
Scholars note that article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides that:
[elach State Party ... undertakes to take steps, individually and through
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the
adoption of legislative measures.70
Pursuant to this article, Korean scholars contend that one cannot invoke
the ICESCR before the domestic court until the appropriate domestic laws
or regulations are enacted.7 For example, individuals are not entitled to
demand the passage of a certain law by the National Assembly before a
court.72 The Code of Administrative Litigation does not allow individuals
to demand government action before a court unless the action is
69. Back, supra note 67, at 8; Yoo, supra note 33, at 100.
70. Cf. ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 2(2):
(2) Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with
its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized
in the present Covenant.
71. Japanese courts also seem to hold the view that the ICESCR does not apply directly
to the domestic cases. See, e.g., the following excerpt from a ruling in the recent "Shiomi"
case:
This Covenant... is not a kind of treaties [sic] whose contents hold good as they are like
domestic law, but a kind of treaties [sic] which require legislative procedures for [its]
contents to be implemented. Thus, it cannot directly become a judgment norm, and does
not immediately affect validity of law. Accordingly, it does not make illegal the decision
[of the Osaka Prefectural Government refusing a handicapped welfare pension to a Korean
lady, Mrs. Shiomi] made in accordance with law.
It is apparent [from Article 2(1) of the Covenant] that the Covenant is premised on the
assumption that the State Parties will use all appropriate means including particularly the
adoption of legislative measures ... for the full realization of the rights recognized in the
Covenant (including of course the right stipulated in Article 9), and that the Covenant
expects the full realization of these rights to be achieved progressively. Accordingly, for
the realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant, legislative measures ... should
be taken within the State Parties to the Covenant.
Yuji Iwasawa, Legal Treatment of Koreans in Japan: The Impact of International Human
Rights Law on Japanese Law, 8 HUM. RTs. Q. 131, 142-143 (1986) (emphasis omitted). See
also KARIN BUHMANN, CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN JAPAN (1989).
72. According to the Petition Law, people can file a petition requesting the enactment of
laws by the National Assembly, but the petition is not legally binding. Law No. 1283 of
Feb. 26, 1963 (Korea).
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stipulated to be a specific legal or regulatory government obligation.
It is doubtful that a clear distinction can be made between civil and
political rights on the one hand, and economic, social, and cultural rights
on the other;73 both categories of human rights are interdependent.74
Nonetheless, rights under the ICESCR which shall be "progressively
realized" are distinguishable from rights under the ICCPR which require
"immediate" relief. The ICCPR rights were specifically developed to
protect against direct intervention and oppression by state power." It is
uncertain how a court, in interpreting the term "progressive," will
consider factors, such as time, resources, and social circumstances, which
affect the enjoyment of rights.76
Turning to the ICESCR, direct application of the ICESCR before
domestic courts is not always denied. For example, article 2(2)," which
forbids discrimination of any kind on the basis of race, sex, religion, or
the like, should be applied directly. 7' An individual whose rights under
the ICESCR have been unfairly denied will be able to request immediate
elimination of such discrimination before the court on the basis of
ICESCR violations.79 In addition, ICESCR articles concerning the
freedom of scientific research and creative activity, 80 and special
protection of working mothers, children, and young persons8' should also
73. MANUAL ON REPORTING, supra note 23, at 4.
74. See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 2,28-45
(1989); Han S. Park, Correlates of Human Rights: Global Tendencies, 9 HuM. RTs. Q. 405
(1987).
75. See Henry J. Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS.
Y.B. 77, 130-32 (1988).
76. Similarly, direct applicability of the Social Charter, which parallels the ICESCR at the
European Community level, is hardly recognized among the European countries. See A.PH.
C.M. JASPERS & L. BETTEN, 25 YEARS: EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER (1988).
77. "The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status." ICESCR, supra note 1, art. 2(2).
78. See Iwasawa, supra note 71, at 143; Yoo, supra note 33, at 100.
79. Equality before the law is also protected under the Korean Constitution. "All citizens
shall be equal before the law, and there shall be no discrimination in all fields of political,
economic, social or cultural life on account of sex, religion or social status." KOREA CONST.
ch. II, art. 11(1).
80. "The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity." ICESCR, supra note 1, art. 15(3).
"All citizens shall enjoy freedom of learning and the arts." KOREA CONST. ch. II, art. 22(1).
81. Article 10 provides that:
(2) Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before
and after childbirth. During such period working mothers should be accorded paid leave
or leave with adequate social security benefits. (3) Special measures of protection and
assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and young persons without any
discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions. Children and young persons
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be applied directly.s2
Aside from the uncertainty about direct applicability, the ICESCR is
law, not merely exhortation or aspiration. The rights it recognizes are as
human, universal, and fundamental as those in the ICCPR."3 The
limitations on obligations, such as the progressive realization of rights
under the ICESCR, do not detract from the legal character of the
obligations. By the same token, the Korean government's undertaking of
the obligations should be followed by good faith reports prepared in
accordance with the ICESCR.
84
B. Hierarchy
Where there are conflicts between domestic laws and the Covenants,
which prevails? Three main views delineate the opinions concerning the
proper scope of domestic laws under Article 6(1) of the Constitution
which provides that "treaties ... shall have the same effect as the
domestic laws. 85
Under the first view, "domestic laws" in Article 6(1) merely refers to
laws enacted by the National Assembly. 6 According to this view,
because the domestic force of international laws (including treaties) is
derived from the Constitution, they are inherently inferior to the
Constitution. The status of treaties is identical to that of domestic laws
enacted by the National Assembly. Thus, if domestic laws and treaties
come into conflict with each other, the principle of lex posterior derogat
priori7 applies.
should be protected from economic and social exploitation. Their employment in work
harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal
development should be punishable by law. States should also set age limits below which
the paid employment of child labor should be prohibited and punishable by law.
ICESCR, supra note 1, arts. 10(2), 10(3).
Special protection for children and young persons is also provided in the Korean
Constitution: "Labor of youth shall be specially protected." KOREA CONST. ch. II, art. 32(5).
82. See Yoo, supra note 33, at 100. If provisions in the existing laws or regulations are
contrary to the ICESCR, the ICESCR may supersede them. Since Yoo gives no concrete
example, however, the meaning of direct applicability under these circumstances is unclear.
83. Louis Henkin, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 1, 10 (Louis
Henkin ed., 1981).
84. See Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of State Parties' Obligations
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HuM. RTs. Q.
156, 165 (1987).
85. KOREA CONST. ch. 1, art. 6(1).
86. See YONG-SONG KWON, HONPOPHAK WOLLI [PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION] 170
(1990).
87. "A later statute overrules an earlier one." LATIN WORDS & PHRASES FOR LAWYERS
139 (R.S. Vasan ed., 1980).
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The second view distinguishes international norms, such as the
Charter of the United Nations, from other treaties. The rank of the latter
is the same as that of domestic laws enacted by the National Assembly."8
According to this view, because international norms are generally
approved and respected in the international community, for domestic
purposes they should rank below the Constitution but above other
domestic laws.
According to the third view, if subsequent domestic laws come into
conflict with the Covenants, the conflicting provisions of the domestic
laws become invalid. 9 This occurs not only because the provisions for
the protection and promotion of human rights set forth in the Covenants
are in accord with the Constitution, but also because the State Parties
undertook the obligation to carry out the necessary legislative measures
to protect the rights recognized in the Covenants. 90 An infringement of
the rights enshrined in the Covenants is regarded as a violation of the
Constitution.
The first view does not distinguish the Covenants from ordinary laws.
Therefore, the application of the Covenants may be replaced by subse-
quent domestic laws. Even in this case, as the third view points out,
obligations of the government under the Covenants should remain. For
example, the government should take steps to adopt legislative or other
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in
the ICCPR as required by article 2(2). Moreover, the government must
also submit reports to the HRC or the Committee of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights on the measures it has adopted which give effect to
the rights recognized or the progress made in the enjoyment of those
rights. The first view does not reconcile the gap between the theoretical
and actual obligations under the Covenants. This view also lessens the
significance of accession to the Covenants in the prevention of human
rights abuses by State Parties.
In the case of the second view, it is unclear whether the Covenants
are within the scope of generally approved and respected international
norms. Even if such is the case, according to this view the Covenants
still rank below the Constitution. However, there are some rights under
88. See Myung-Bong Chang, Chong-gang [General Principles], in KOMMENTAL HONPOP
[COMMENTARY OF THE CONSTITUTION] 61, 80-82 (Chol-Su Kim ed., 1988). The first and
second views existed before South Korea's ratification of the Covenants, and in theory,
ratification is unlikely to affect them.
89. See Chun, supra note 67, at 76; Yoo, supra note 33, at 100.
90. See Chun, supra note 67, at 76; Yoo, supra note 33, at 100.
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the Covenants, such as the inherent right to life,91 and special protection
of working mothers' and juvenile offenders,93 which are not specifically
addressed in the Constitution. Because South Korea has expressed its
commitment to such rights, the government should take necessary
measures to protect them even if they are not mentioned in the Constitu-
tion. Therefore, at least as far as such rights are concerned, the Cove-
nants supplement the Constitution and, for these rights, there are no
grounds with which to argue that the Covenants rank below the Constitu-
tion. Furthermore, the obligations of the government under the Cove-
nants listed in the first view still apply under the second view.
From the foregoing commentary, one may conclude that Article 6(1)
of the Constitution simply provides that international laws are, upon their
ratification and promulgation under the Constitution, effectively incorpo-
rated into the domestic legal system without separate legislation, 94 and
that the Article does not stipulate a hierarchy between domestic laws and
the Covenants. In other words, "domestic laws" in Article 6(1) of the
Constitution is a general term meaning "laws of South Korea," referring
to the Constitution as well as to laws passed by the National Assembly.
Thus, the Covenants cannot be superseded by subsequent domestic laws
or other legislation.
With regard to the relationship between the Constitution and the
Covenants, attention should be directed to the special characteristics of
the Covenants. Whereas ordinary international laws and treaties usually
deal with conflicts between different States, the Covenants endeavor to
protect and promote the human rights of individuals and minorities
96
91. "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 6(1).
92. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
93. The ICCPR's provision for juvenile offenders reads:
(2)(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and brought as speedily
as possible for adjudication. (3) The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of
prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation.
Juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate
to their age and legal status.
ICCPR, supra note 2, arts. 10(2)(b), 10(3).
94. In this sense, it may be said that South Korea belongs to the group of "monist"
countries which do not need a separate legislation or transformation procedure for the
application of international law. See THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., 1992).
95. See Baek, supra note 67, at 10; Chun, supra note 67, at 76.
96. "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion,
or to use their own language." ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 27.
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regardless of citizenship. 97 The Covenants are the products not of
negotiation between countries concerned about their national interests, but
of universal ideals and common sense aimed at extending fundamental
freedoms to people oppressed by state power. In this respect, the
Covenants are distinguishable from other international treaties. Instead
of the government of each State Party performing its obligations to
governments of other State Parties, the Covenants create government
obligations toward individuals.
The obligations of the States under the Covenants are basically to
individuals within their borders, rather than to counterpart governments,
although reports concerning the observance of the Covenants are
submitted to international human rights bodies. Accordingly, with regard
to the protection and promotion of human rights, the Constitution and
Covenants are not positioned to conflict with each other. The Covenants
simply complement the interpretation and implementation of the Constitu-
tion towards a more complete protection of human rights, and they
provide international standards and precedents. Nevertheless, if under
unpredicted circumstances a constitutional provision is interpreted so that
it no longer protects human rights, the Covenants should be used to
challenge that interpretation.
C. Laws Violating Fundamental Human Rights Norms
This part reviews some important laws which have caused serious
human rights abuses in Korean society, particularly in the context of
ICCPR violations.
1. National Security Law
The National Security Law (NSL) restricts basic rights of Korean
citizens in order to maintain national security.98 This law was created in
1948 during a period of hostility between the two Koreas, immediately
after the establishment of two separate governments in South and North
Korea.99 After the NSL was amended several times, it was changed to
the Anti-Communist Law of 1961, and after that, the newly reinforced
97. See HENRY J. STEINER & DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 453
(2d ed. 1986).
98. For a comprehensive analysis of the NSL, see WON-SON PAK, KUKKA POANPOP
YONGU [STUDY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW] (1992) (three volume set).
99. COUNTER REPORT, supra note 12, at 36.
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NSL was promulgated in 1980. The NSL was most recently amended in
1991. 0o
The NSL has long been criticized for violating the principle of
legality, nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege, because its articles are
vague and abstract in their essence as well as in their application. 01 For
example, article 4 of the NSL punishes acts of treason, espionage, or
sabotage carried out under instruction from an anti-State organization
(North Korea).'° Article 7 of the NSL punishes acts that benefit North
Korea by praising it, encouraging it, siding with it, or conspiring to
commit such an offence."0 3 In addition, it prohibits the importing,
disseminating, buying, or selling of documents, drawings, or other means
of expression which benefit or support an anti-State organization. Such
language under the NSL has been abused to restrict the freedoms of
thought, conscience, and expression, as well as the right to know
protected by articles 18 and 19 of the ICCPR.'0 4 Furthermore, under
article 10 of the NSL, anyone with knowledge of another person's
criminal act as defined by the NSL who has failed to inform an investiga-
tive or intelligence agency is subject to fines and imprisonment for up to
five years. 05  This provision violates freedom of conscience, i.e., the
freedom to be silent.1 6
100. Id. at 37.
101. The South Korean government has used the NSL to condemn a variety of actions:
Over the years, the National Security Law (NSL) has been widely used to imprison people
who, according to the government, visited North Korea, met North Koreans or alleged
North Korean agents abroad, expressed support for North Korea or views similar to North
Korean positions, listened to North Korean broadcasting, or possessed North Korean or
other Marxist books. Conviction under the NSL can result in long prison sentences or the
death penalty. Despite the fact that all the political parties have agreed since 1988 that it
should be revised, the NSL remains the most frequently used instrument of repression
against government dissidents in South Korea. Thirty-three percent of the political
prisoners as of June 1990 were detained under the National Security Law.
ASIA WATCH, supra note 11, at 8.
102. Law No. 2769 of July 16, 1975, amended by Law No. 3318 of Dec. 31, 1980, art.
4 (Korea) [hereinafter NSLI.
103. Id. art. 7.
104. "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion."
ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 18(1). "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice." Id. art. 19(2).
105. NSL, supra note 102, art. 10.
106. See COUNTER REPORT, supra note 12, at 47-48. The NSL remains the South Korean
government's main weapon for suppressing domestic dissent and inhibiting unauthorized
exchanges with North Korea. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 30, at 929.
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2. Security Observation Law
The Security Observation Law" was introduced as an amended
version of the notorious NSL.'08 Article 1 of the Law defines its purpose
as follows:
The purpose of this Law is to take security observation measure[s] upon
such persons who have committed specific crimes in order to prevent the
danger of their recommitting crime and promote their return to normal,
sound social life, and thereby to maintain national security and social
peace. °9
People who have been imprisoned for violations of certain articles of
the NSL and other laws related to national security and who are "deemed
to require observation [to prevent the repetition of crimes] because there
[are] sufficient ground[s] to [believe there is] the danger of recommitting
the crime[s]" may be placed under security observation for two years.
10
The decision to impose security observation is made by the Minister of
Justice on the resolution of the Security Observation Committee, upon the
request of a public prosecutor. The period of observation may be
extended using the same procedures for two years without limit on the
number of such extensions."'
A person under security observation must report within seven days,
to the chief of the police station concerned, various personal information
including information about friends and relatives, the status of personal
and family property, religious and other organizational memberships, and
work and emergency contact addresses." 2 Moreover, he must make a
report every three months, giving details of major activities, meetings,
trips, and other matters as deemed appropriate by the chief of the police
station." 3 If he takes refuge or escapes to avoid security observation, or
fails to make the above reports, he may be fined or imprisoned for up to
three years.
11 4
In sum, the Security Observation Law subjects persons who have
already served their sentences to administrative measures which impose
107. Law No. 4132 of June 16, 1989, amended by Law No. 4396 of Nov. 22, 1991
(Korea) [hereinafter Security Observation Law].
108. NSL, supra note 102.
109. Security Observation Law, supra note 107, art. 1.
110. Id. art. 4.
111. Id. arts. 5, 7, 10-15; COUNTER REPORT, supra note 12, at 55.
112. Security Observation Law, supra note 107, art. 18(1).
113. Id. art. 18(2).
114. Id. art. 27.
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reporting requirements in violation of freedom of conscience. This law
also infringes the freedom to determine and move residences, the right to
privacy (including the right to associate or communicate), and the rights
of family and friends. This law clearly violates articles 12, 17, and 18
of the ICCPR."5
3. Law on Assembly and Demonstration
The Law on Assembly and Demonstration was enacted in 1989.116
Although this law declares that its purpose is to guarantee the right of
assembly and demonstration which are the essence of freedom of
expression in a democratic society," 7 it has been misused to control and
restrict various opinions expressed in the form of assemblies or demon-
strations." 8 For example, article 5 of the Law defines the types of
assemblies and demonstrations which are prohibited: assemblies or
demonstrations which would clearly cause a direct threat to the public
safety and order by collective violence, threat, damage, or arson.1
1 9
Article 6 of the Law requires persons or organizations organizing or
sponsoring an outdoor assembly or demonstration to give forty-eight hour
prior notice to police authorities specifying the purpose, date, place, and
sponsors of the assembly or demonstration.1 20 Then, police authorities
can prohibit the assembly or demonstration for disruption of traffic flow
115. See COUNTER REPORT, supra note 12, at 56. "Everyone lawfully within the territory
of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence." ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 12(1). "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful
attacks on his honour and reputation." Id. art. 17(1).
To date, Suh Jun-shik is the only person to have been charged with violation of the
(Security Observation Law]. Suh Jun-shik was imprisoned in 1971 for alleged espionage
activities and when his sentence expired in 1978 he remained in detention under the
Public Security Law until his release in 1988 because he refused to 'convert to anti-
communism'. After his release in 1988, Suh Jun-shik was required to report under the
terms of the [Security Observation Law]. He was re-arrested in June 1991 on several
charges, including a charge under the [Security Observation Law] for failure to make a
regular report of his activities. Amnesty International adopted Suh Jun-shik as a prisoner
of conscience during his imprisonment from 1971 to 1988 and considered the charges
under the [Security Observation Law] to be a violation of his rights to freedom of
expression and association.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS, supra note 29, at 18.
116. Law No. 4095 of March 29, 1989, amended by Law No. 4408 of Nov. 30, 1991
(Korea) [hereinafter Law on Assembly and Demonstration].
117. Il art. 1.
118. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS, supra note 29, at 19-20; COUNTER
REPORT, supra note 12, at 72-78; Jong-Hyun Yoon, Jiphoe Kyulsa-ui Jayu [Freedoms of
Assembly and Demonstration], 4 INKWON BoGosu [HUM. RTS. REP.] 86-111 (1990).
119. Law on Assembly and Demonstration, supra note 116, art. 5.
120. Il art. 6.
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or other reasons, in addition to the reasons listed in article 5." Using
these articles, the government can effectively ban any assembly or
demonstration at its discretion.
These restrictions, such as requiring prior notice (which in substance
is equivalent to requiring prior authorization of an assembly or demon-
stration) and granting broad discretionary power to the police to prohibit
an assembly or demonstration, appear to violate the freedom of expres-
sion guaranteed under the ICCPR.
4. Laws Prohibiting Interference by a Third Party
Article 12-2 of the Labor Union Law 2 and article 13-2 of the Labor
Dispute Adjustment Law 23 provide as follows:
Persons other than a worker who has actual relations with the employer,
or concerned trade union, or other persons having legitimate authority
under law shall not engage in an act of interference for the purpose of
manipulating, instigat[ing], obstructing, or any other act to influence the
concerned parties in an establishment or dissolution of a trade union,
joining or not joining a trade union, or in collective bargaining with the
employer.
These provisions against third party interference in both the Labor
Union Law and the Labor Dispute Adjustment Law were enacted in 1980
during a period of severe labor oppression in order to prevent two
church-related organizations, the Urban Industrial Mission and the
Catholic Workers Movement, from educating and organizing workers.'24
Since then, these laws have been used repeatedly to suppress the
burgeoning labor movement, typically to prohibit non-laborers from
supporting the labor movement. 25 With regard to the abuse of these
provisions, the Lawyers for a Democratic Society and the National
Council of Churches in Korea jointly reported as follows:
These provisions have served a double purpose: by punishing the people
121. See id. arts. 8, 10-12.
122. Law No. 1329 of Apr. 17, 1963, amended by Law No. 3966 of Nov. 28, 1987
(Korea).
123. Law No. 1327 of Apr. 13, 1963, amended by Law No. 3351 of Dec. 31, 1980
(Korea).
124. ASIA WATCH, supra note 11, at 33.
125. The Constitutional Court held that the provisions were constitutional and justifiably
restrict action interfering with political objectives that are "irrelevant to the improvement of
salary and other working conditions," and that they were not so vague as to create unacceptable
difficulties in determining their proper interpretation in the context of criminal prosecutions.
89 Honka 103 (Jan. 15, 1990). See James M. West & Dae-Kyu Yoon, The Constitutional
Court of the Republic of Korea: Transforming the Jurisprudence of the Vortex? 40 AM. J.
COMp. L. 73, 109 (1992).
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who supported the labor movement, [the government] has also isolated
the workers. Furthermore, these provisions have never been used to
punish the 'third parties' who took the side of the management. In these
provisions, crime is very vaguely and abstractly defined as 'an act of
interference for the purpose of manipulating, instigating, obstructing or
any other act to influence the concerned parties.' The abstractness and
vagueness of the provisions make it impossible to have a reasonable
extrapolation of the types of actions that are actually prohibited, and
have thus been used for the violation of human rights.' 26
These third party interference provisions are unique to the Korean
legal system. They also appear to violate the freedom of expression
under the ICCPR.
IV. THE COURTS AND THE COVENANTS
A. Ordinary Court
Since the ratification of the Covenants, no Korean court, including the
Supreme Court, has decided a case on the basis of the Covenants. In
several criminal cases, defendants indicted under the NSL or other laws
mentioned in Part III.C. argued that they were not guilty because such
laws conflicted with the Covenants and were invalid, but the courts did
not accept their arguments. The courts found the defendants guilty, but
the courts did not indicate whether the laws at issue were contrary to the
Covenants." 7 Under Korean law, if a trial court refuses to rule on the
basis of the Covenants despite the argument of the accused, no procedure
is available to appeal and obtain an adjudication on the basis of the
Covenants. The defendant can only file a petition with the Constitutional
Court insisting that the law in question is unconstitutional. 28 Currently,
the courts' view of the relationship between the domestic laws and the
126. COUNTER REPORT, supra note 12, at 59.
127. See iad at 7-8.
128. The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court encompasses five categories of actions:
1. Questions of the constitutionality of laws upon request of the courts;
2. Impeachment;
3. Dissolution of political parties;
4. Jurisdictional disputes between state agencies; and
5. Constitutional petitions.
KOREA CONST. ch. VI, art. I11.
For a detailed analysis of adjudications and developments in the Constitutional Court, see
West & Yoon, supra note 125. See also Joo-Won Kim, Honpop Jaepan Anpak-ui Inkwon
Sanghwang [Human Rights and the Constitutional Court], 4 INKWON BoGosu [HUM. RTs.
REP.] 275 (1990). In this article, Kim argues that even the adjudications of ordinary courts
should fall under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.
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Covenants is unclear. It seems that the courts are reluctant to admit the
Covenants as a source of law in domestic cases, probably due to their
ignorance of international human rights law.' 29
B. Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court of South Korea (the Court) rules on the
constitutionality of laws, regulations, and other administrative actions of
government authorities upon petition by individuals or ordinary courts.
In 1990, the Dong-A Ilbo, a defendant in a damage suit, was ordered by
a civil district court to publish a notice of apology and pay damages to
the plaintiff, whose reputation was damaged by an article appearing in a
monthly magazine owned by the Dong-A Ilbo. In April 1991, the Court
held that if article 764 of the Civil Code" ° is interpreted so that the
Dong-A Ilbo must acknowledge its transgressions in a newspaper, such
a provision would unconstitutionally conflict with the freedom of con-
science protected by Article 19 of the Constitution.1
3'
The Court ruled that, although the monthly magazine's article
published by the petitioner injured another person's reputation, the
petitioner is not required to publish an apology against its conscience in
addition to paying damages. Deciding the unconstitutionality of the
compulsory apology on the basis of Article 19 of the Constitution, the
Court referred to article 18(2) of the ICCPR as follows:
Since the Constitution provides that all citizens shall enjoy the freedom
of conscience, the freedom of conscience is protected as one of the
fundamental rights .... The conscience that the Constitution stipulates
covers not only the freedom of thought that does not allow for the state
power to intervene in the ethical matters of the individuals such as the
act of deciding between the right and wrong, or virtue and vice, but also
the freedom of silence that is protected against coercion to express one's
thoughts or ethical determinations .... This is derived from the will to
protect more perfectly the freedom of spiritual activities which has
become the root of democracy and has played a significant role in the
development and improvement of human beings. . . . Furthermore,
Article 18 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which our country ratified in 1990 also provides that no one shall be
subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt
129. Cf precedents of Japanese courts which implicitly acknowledged the direct
applicability of many articles of the ICCPR. Iwasawa, supra note 71, at 142 n.54.
130. "The court may, on the application of the injured party, order the person who has
impaired another's fame to take suitable measures to restore the injured party's reputation,
either in lieu of or together with compensation for damages." KOREA CIVIL CODE art. 764.
131. 89 Honma 160 (Apr. 1, 1991).
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a religion or belief of his choice.... Therefore, the coerced apology,
as it distorts and perverts one's conscience, is an unconstitutional
restriction of the freedom of conscience which is one of the fundamental
spiritual rights to be protected under the Constitution.
32
This is the first ruling of the Court that referred to the ICCPR while
ruling on the constitutionality of a domestic law. The Dong-A Ilbo case
indicates that the Court can and should refer to the Covenants in all
domestic cases which substantively involve infringements of human
rights, even if the Court rules only on the basis of the Constitution.'
33
On the other hand, in the Yoo Sang-Duk case, 3 4 the Court did not
refer to the ICCPR. The petitioner, who was arrested for the violation of
the NSL, argued: (1) during communications between the petitioner and
his counsel, the officers of the National Security Planning Agency
recorded the contents of their communications and took pictures; (2) the
petitioner requested respect for the confidentiality of the communications
with his attorney, but they did not stop recording; and (3) as a result, the
petitioner's right to communicate with counsel guaranteed in Article 12(4)
of the Constitution 35 and article 14(3)(b) of the ICCPR 136 was violated.
The Court held that the recording and photographing by the officers
of the National Security Planning Agency violated the petitioner's right
under the Constitution to be assisted by counsel, but the Court was silent
as to whether the ICCPR also prohibits such acts. As in the situation of
the lower courts, this appears to be an example of the Court's unfamiliari-
ty with the significance, effect, and contents of the Covenants. In this
respect, it may be hasty to conclude that the Dong-A Ilbo case is a
landmark decision that will be followed in the future.
132. This ruling might indicate that the Covenants are superior to domestic laws legislated
by the National Assembly.
133. This is very similar to the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of the former
Federal Republic of Germany. Under German law, a law can be declared void solely on the
basis of the Federal Constitution. The fundamental rights set forth in the Federal Constitution,
however, must be interpreted with regard to the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights. See THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 93, at 121-29.
134. 91 Honma 111 (June 14, 1991).
135. "Any person who is arrested or detained shall have the right to prompt assistance of
counsel. When a criminal defendant is unable to secure counsel by his own efforts, the State
shall assign counsel for the defendant as prescribed by law." KOREA CONST. ch. II, art. 12(4).
136. "In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled
to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: ... To have adequate time and facilities
for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing."
ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 14(3)(b).
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CONCLUSION
Despite the ambiguity in the understanding and implementation of the
Covenants, South Korea's ratification of the Covenants was a historic
moment in the enhancement of human rights for a Korean people who
continually yearn for a democratic society. Given the Covenant's
significant contribution to world peace and the improvement of funda-
mental rights, powerful instruments are now available to help the Korean
people bring their cases to the attention of the international community.
Moreover, an independent source of law now exists which can be directly
applied in the domestic arena as a supplement to the Constitution and
domestic laws.
This article began with the premise that the Covenants were drafted
for the protection and promotion of human rights regardless of nationali-
ty, gender, religion, language, and the like. Each country, however, must
start by resolving human rights violations within its own territory. Article
10 of the Constitution of South Korea provides that "[a]ll citizens shall
be assured of human worth and dignity and have the right to pursue
happiness. It shall be the duty of the State to confirm and guarantee the
fundamental and inviolable human rights of individuals."' 37 Man is a
universal being. Human rights should be respected, enjoyed, and shared
at any time and at any place, not smothered within the confines of a
limited territory. Although the Covenants have some intrinsic limitations,
this premise remains valid.
Therefore, the role of international human rights bodies such as the
HRC under the ICCPR, and the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights under the ICESCR should be strengthened in order to
monitor governments more effectively and to enforce the Covenants.
This will encourage the government of South Korea, as well as other
State Parties, to perform its responsibilities under the Covenants in good
faith, and to prepare reports for Committees with the sincerity and
credibility required under the Covenants.
Under Korean law, the Covenants are duly incorporated into the
domestic legal arena. The Covenants, therefore, should rank as a
supreme norm on the same level as the Constitution and be directly
applied to domestic cases with the fewest limitations possible. As far as
the protection and promotion of human rights is concerned, domestic laws
enacted by the legislature or other government authorities should not be
obstacles. They should be invalid, regardless of the time of enactment,
137. KOREA CONST. ch. II, art. 10.
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to the extent they contradict the Covenants. The principles, experience,
and wisdom embodied in the Covenants, however, are not well known to
the Korean people. In this sense, accession to the Covenants is yet to
come.
